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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
ALLEN-HOWE SPECIALTIES CORP., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
U.S. CONSTRUCTION, INC., a 
corporation, JACOBS ENGINEERING 
CO., a corporation, and WYOMING 
MINERAL CORPORATION, a 
corporation, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 16209 
I. WHETHER PLAINTIFF AND U. S. 
CONSTRUCTION AGREED TO AN 
ACCORD AND SATISFACTION IS A 
GENIUNE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT. 
Respondents principally rely upon an ac~ord and 
satisfaction to sustain the summa~y iudgment entered in their 
favor. (Brief of Respondents at 9-29). An accord and satisfaction 
cannot exist unless, as with other contracts, both partie~ assent to 
it. ~he Record now before this Court plainly reveals that whether 
there was ever a "meeting of the minds" between plaintiff and U. S. 
Construction is a genuine issue of matPrial fact. The Record 
contains the following evidence raising this question of fact 
IR<'corrl citations apoear in Brief of Apoellant 27-32): 
(1) On two seoarate occasions, more than a month apart, 
nlaintiff's presirlent, William C. Howe, Jr., refused to sign lien 
'.'iJ •ors tenc1erorl to him hv U.S. Construction until they were changer! 
-1-
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to reflect a partial rather than full waiver. When Mr. Howe arriv~ 
at u. s. Construction's office to pick up plaintiff's check, a u.s. 
Construction employee, Patricia Platts, who was herself authorized 
to sign checks, presented him with a check and a separate lien 
waiver form. Mr. Howe was supposed to sign the lien waiver in order 
to receive the check. He refused to release all of plaintiff's 
claims for additional compensation in exchange for the check. Mr. 
Rowe then changed the lien waiver to reflect only a partial, rather 
than a full, waiver. Ms. Platts accepted the lien waiver as 
altered, made a xerox copy of it for Mr. Howe, and then released th! 
corresponding check to him. 
The checks Mr. Howe received contain standard printed 
lien-waiver language on the back. In this case, in which U. S. 
Construction used separate lien waivers, the standard form language 
on the back of the checks was redundant. Recognizing the 
redundancy, Mr. Howe, with the permission of an officer of U. S. 
Construction's bank, made the sam~ change on the checks that he han 
made on the lien waiver -- that is, changing "full" to "partial." 
This procedure was followed in August and again in September. 
In their brief, Respondents claim that because they are 
relying upon the standard form language printed on the back of U. 
Construction's checks rather than the separate lien waivers, the 
fart that Mr. Howe refuse~ to sign the lien waiver forms ann 
communicated that refusal to ~1s. Platts, aU. S. Constructi0n 
employee, is irrelevant. Respondents iqnore the ohvious fact that 
the lien waiver forms an,-1 ch"c~c con~3i'"l oara''"l lanquaqe an~ tha: 
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Mr. Howe, plaintiff's president, refused to agree to a full lien 
waiver, and communicated that refusal to U. S. Construction. 
(2) Plaintiff's president changed the standard form 
language on U. s. Construction's checks to reflect only a partial 
lien waiver three times, each time about a month after the last. 
u. S. Construction should have been aware from its cancelled checks 
alone that plaintiff refused to assent to an accord and 
satisfaction, yet continueo to release checks to him. 
(3) While U. S. Construction was issuing checks to 
plaintiff that supposedly constituted an accord and satisfaction, 
plaintiff and U. s. Construction were negotiating over plaintiff's 
claims for adoitional compensation. Plaintiff sent u. S. 
Construction invoices and proposals for extra compensation, and 
attended meetings with U. S. Construction representatives to discuss 
them. For example, plaintiff, representatives of U. S. Construction 
and representatives of Jacobs Engineering (the project engineer) met 
on August 22, 1977 to discuss plaintiff's claim for adoitional 
compensation; some of the claims related back to the beginning of 
the job, well before plaintiff endorsed some of the checks that 
Respondents contend amount to an accord and satisfaction. (R. 237, 
ex. D-9; ex. D-10; ex. D-12; ex. D-34; ex. D-35). 
On August 18, 1977, plaintiff's president and U. S. 
Construction's president had previously met to review plaintiff's 
cl~im in Preparation for the August 22 meeting. (R. 238 at 
'o7-123). On SeptPm~er 28, 1977, U. S. Construction approved for 
oa·:~ent a claim ma~P hy Plaintiff for interference from a crane that 
-1-
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occurred on July 20, 1977. (R. 237, ex. D-27). One of the checks 
that plaintiff endorsed intervened in time, but was obviously not 
reqarded as barring plaintiff's claim. 
These facts demonstrate a course of dealing between 
plaintiff and U. S. Construction that raises at least a question of 
fact about whether the standard form language on u. s. 
Construction's checks was intended by either plaintiff or U. s. 
Construction to create an accord and satisfaction barring 
plaintiff's claims for additional compensation. 
Two decisions published after Appellant's original brief 
was prepared demonstrate that a summary judgment should not have 
been granted on the basis of an accord and satisfaction. In KOVO v. 
McCrimmon, No. 15735 {Utah, 1/23/79), an advertiser sent KOVO radio 
a check with a restrictive endorsement indicating that it was 
tendered in full satisfaction of his account. A KOVO representatil'' 
scratched out the endorsement, called the advertiser to tell him 
that the check was being accepted as partial payment only, and that 
he could stop payment on it if he insisted on the condition. KOVO 
thereafter cashed the check. The trial court found as a fact that 
there was no accord and satisfaction. This court affirmed, statinc 
Such ~onclusion [that an accord ann satisfaction was 
not estahlishen] amolv is suoporten hy KOVO's refusal to accept 
the endors,.,ment, ann the failure by [the anvertiser] to stop 
pavment simply emphasizes such conclusion. 
The present 'ase is similar. Plaintiff's president told 
U.S. Construction that he v.•o,Jld not waivP 'li5 lien rights, anc1 was 
nevertheless aiven not one hut three rhe,ks nv~r a DPrion of three 
- ~ -
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only upon such a condition, it could have refused to give the checks 
to plaintiff or stopped payment on them upon learning that plaintiff 
would not agree to the condition. It did neither. 
In Fritz v. Marantette, 404 Mich. 329, 273 N.W.2d 425 
(1978), a buyer and seller of corn fell into a dispute over whether 
$15,282.21 or $24,000 was due the buyer. The buyer sent a check for 
the lesser sum (which he admitted he owed) and placed a restrictive 
endorsement on the back reciting full payment. After some 
conversations with the buyer, the seller crossed out the restrictive 
endorsement and cashed the check. The Michigan court affirmed the 
trial court's finding that no accord and satisfaction had been 
reached: 
[I]t is clear that whether a particular set of 
facts amounts to an accord and satisfaction is generally a 
question of fact for the fact finder. One of the key elements, 
which the trier of fact must find to reach the conclusion that 
an accord and satisfaction exists, is a "meeting of the minds.• 
In the instant case, plaintiff's conduct and the 
testimony of the parties presents a question of fact as to 
whether the negotiation of the conditioned check constituted an 
accord and satisfaction. 
Id. at 273 N.W. 2d 427 (emphasis supplied). 
The same question of fact -- whether there was a meeting of 
the minds with respect to an accord and satisfaction -- is apparent 
i~ the Record now before this Court. For the same reason that the 
~ichigan court refused to overrule the trial court's finding on this 
fact'Jal issue, this Court shouln reverse the summary judgment that 
r<?f:JS<Od even t0 recognize the existence of a factual issue. 
As an alternative ground, the Michigan court heln that the 
'
11
"'a"c1 accord ann satisfaction lacked consideration: 
-s-
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Alternatively, the jury could find that the amount 
paid represented the undisputed portion of the corn contract. 
~he facts indicate that the so-called "dispute" concerned only 
the amount to be deducted for damages assertedly suffered 
because of the delivery of inferior corn. The defendant 
deducted the full amount of the asserted damages and thus the 
amount deducted does not represent any compromise or 
settlement. The defendant "merely paid what both sides 
acknowledged was due." See Gitre, supra, 624, 198 N.W.2d 405, 
to support the proposition that payment of the undisputed 
eortion of a contract will not support an accord and 
satisfaction discharging the balance. 
~· at 427 N.W.2d 428 (emphasis supplied). 
The facts upon which the Michigan based its finding of no 
consideration are identical to those of the present case. One part 
to a single contract claimed he owed one amount; the other claimed 
that more was due. The contract was, therefore, unliquidated. T~ 
debtor paid only what he admitted was due. The Michigan Supreme 
Court ruled exactly as plaintiff urges this Court to rule that 
payment of only the part of a debt that the debtor admits he owes i; 
not consideration for an accord and satisfaction. 
Apart from the consideration issue, whether plaintiff and 
U. S. Construction even had a meeting of the minds with respect to 
an accord and satisfaction is subject to grave dispute on the facts 
in the Record. The summary judgment denying plaintiff the 
opportunity to have a trier of fact resolve the question was a 
serious injustice. 
II. PLAINTIFF MAY RECOVER ADDITIONAL 
COMPENSATION IN QUASI-CONTRACT. 
Responrlents, at paoes 32-34 of their brief, erroneously 
assert that because Plaintiff has a subcontract with U. S. 
Construction, plaintiff mav not recover in quasi-contract, either 
-h-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
quantum meruit or for unjust enrichment. Respondents cite Jaye 
Smith Const. v. Bd. of Ed., Granite School Diet., 560 P.2d 320 (Utah 
1977) as authority. 
Jaye Smith is not at all relevant to plaintiff's 
quasi-contractual claims. In Jaye Smith, a contractor who submitted 
a bid on a school building was unsure of the price or availability 
of the type of roofing material called for, and therefore enclosed a 
note with his bid reserving the right to raise or lower it depending 
upon the actual price of the material. 
When the formal contract was signed following the school 
district's acceptance of the contractor's bid, the contractor failed 
to include the contingency in the contract. The school district 
contended that it did not have any knowledge of the contingency 
until four to six weeks after the contract was signed. When the 
contractor finally acquired the roofing material, it proved to be 
about $3,000 more expensive than he had anticipated. 
The contractor was not allowed to pass the additional 
expense on to the school district. The contractor was aware of the 
uncertain price of the roofing material before the contract was 
entered into, and, despite that awareness, signed a fixed-price 
contract with no provision for any increase. Jaye Smith did not 
involve any substantial change in the nature or scope of work done: 
it merely involved a $3,000 increase in the cost of roofing material. 
In the present case, the nature and extent of the work done 
b~ Plaintiff proved to be vastly different than called for under the 
suhcontract. Thera were numerous changes in the project plans and 
-7-
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specifications: the concrete foundation that had to be in place 
before plaintiff could begin work was weeks late: the structural 
steel vas not delivered directly to the job site as had been 
promised, but was stacked so far away that plaintiff was forced to 
employ an otherwise unnecessary crane to load the steel onto a 
truck, transport it to the job site and, again with a crane, remove 
it from the truck: identifying markings on the steel were 
sandblasted away and steel threads were painted over. Moreover, in 
order to prevent the start-up delay from delaying the project, the 
project engineer schedulen large amounts of simultaneous work by 
many crafts, depriving plaintiff of the opportunity to work without 
interference. (Record citations in Brief of Appellant at 3-4). 
In an affidavit, which must be considered as true in 
summary iudgment proceedings, plaintiff's president testified that 
these factors "substantially changed the nature and scope of 
plaintiff's work from that disclosed in [the] drawings and 
specifications ... " (R. 166-167 at ~13). This testimony, together 
with the very maqnitude of plaintiff's claim, reveals that the 
subcontract was, in essence, abandoned ann plaintiff was required t: 
do suhstantiallv different work than that contemplated in the 
subcontract. Jaye Smith, the case on which respondents rely, 
involved merely a price increase in roofing material, not a 
substantial change in the scope or magnitude of the work. 
It has long been the rule in Utah that when the work a 
contractor actuallv performs turns out to he substantially differe·· 
than it appear~>rl at thl' birlrlinq staqr>, the contractor mav recover · 
-R-
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quasi-contract for the extra work. It is original brief, plaintiff 
cited Wunderlich Contracting Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 201 
(lOth Cir. 1957) and Salt Lake City v. Smith, 104 F. 457 (8th Cir. 
1900), both applying Utah law, as authority for this rule. !!! !!!2 
Thorn Construction Co., Inc. v. Utah Department of Transportation, 
598 P.2d 365 (Utah 1979); Richards Contracting Co. v. Fullmer 
Brothers, 18 Utah 2d 177, 417 P.2d 755 (1966). Respondents did not 
even mention these cases in their brief. Respondents' only attempt 
to refute plaintiff's claim for quasi-contractual recovery was to 
say that quasi-contractual recovery is improper where there is a 
written contract. 
Respondents' refutation is obviously insufficient. There 
were written contracts involved in both Wunderlich and~· 
Qua3i-contractual recovery was nevertheless allowed because the 
extra work performed was beyond the scope of the written contracts, 
just as plaintiff's work was beyond the scope of its written 
subcontract. 
If the work plaintiff actually performed was substantially 
different or more extensive than appeared when the subcontract was 
executed, plaintiff is entitled to recover in quasi-contract. 
Because such recovery is in quasi-contract, the provisions of the 
abandoned subcontract have no application. 
Whether the work plaintiff did was substantially different 
fro~ that contemplated hy the subcontract is, of course, a question 
of fact raised in an affidavit filed in this action. A summary 
-9-
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judg .. nt against plaintiff based on the contractual defenses is, 
therefore, manifestly improper. As this Court has observed: 
A contract with specific terms cannot remain 
hypertechnically specific after the parties decide on extras, 
which was the case here, in which event another contract in 
quasi-contract arises based on a so-called quantum meruit •.. 
Richards Contracting Co. v. Fullmer Brothers, 18 Utah 2d 177, 417 
'· 2d 755 ( 1966) • 
III. THE SUBCONTRACT DOES NOT 
BAR PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR 
ADDITIONAL COMPENSATION. 
A. Plaintiff Complied With the Subcontract. 
Even if this Court could ignore the affidavit of 
plaintiff's president (R. 166-167) and hold that plaintiff mav not 
recover in quasi-contract, plaintiff's claims still would not be 
barred by the provisions of the subcontract itself. Respondents 
correctly point out, at pages 30-31 of their brief, that the 
subcontract provisions purport to require plaintiff to give written 
notice of claims for extra work, nelay and interference no later 
than five days after the date of the occurrence giving rise to the 
claim. 
Respondents then erroneouslv argue that plaintiff failed t 
suhmit its claims within five davs of the relevant occurrences. 
When making that assertion, Respondents ignored a written proposal 
dated August 8, 1977 that plaintiff sent to U.S. Construction, whe· 
plaintiff's work was, oerhaps, only half complete. (The Record doe 
nnt reveal the exact pPrcentaqe of complPtion as of that date.) 
That proposal (R. 237, PX. D-121 requested that the ;-uhcontrilct I>P 
amendPd to grant pl~int1fF an additional $SS,O~S.15, $35,173.00 -' 
-lC-
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which was the estimated expense of additional work to be done in the 
~· 
The proposal recites that it is a claim for additional 
compensation for the following reasons: 
Interference of structures, process equipment, piping, 
mechanical, electrical work, materials and workmen with safe and 
orderly erection of structural steel, liner panel, and exterior 
panels. 
Initial delays having to do with concrete pours, material 
deliveries, improper base plates, lack of marks on steel, lack 
of shims, mud and inadequate backfilling, delays in steel 
deliveries and painting, and fabricating errors & corrections 
have compounded the problem of interferences, because other 
crafts and trades have had to proceed with their work to meet 
project requirements. 
This proposal constitutes an advance written claim for additional 
compensation for all work done after August 8, 1977. With respect 
to wor~ done after that date, plaintiff complied with the letter of 
the contract hy requesting advance approval for the work. 
B. U. S. Construction Waived the Subcontract's 
Written-Notice-of-Claims ProviSion. 
It is well-established that contractual provisions in 
construction contracts requiring written notice of claims for 
additional compensation to be made either before the work is done or 
within a short term thereafter may be waived. Rivercliff Co. v. 
Linebarger, 223 Ark. lOS, 264 S.W.2d 842, cert. denied, 348 U. S. 
834 (1954) (waiver by subsequent conduct in paying claims for which 
·.nitten approval hail not been obtained); Vitra-Spray of Florida, 
Inc. v. Gumenick, 144 So.2d 533 (Fla. App. 1962) (same);~., 2 
l>.L.R.3r1 620 §§19-27 (1965). 
-11-
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The Record now before this Court contains evidence of such 
a waiver. On July 20, 1977, a crane operated by the project's 
en9ineerin9 firm, Defendant Jacob's Engineering, interfered with 
plaintiff's crane, causing plaintiff considerable additional labor 
costs. Plaintiff's first written claim for this interference was~~ 
Au9ust 25, 1977, substantially more than five days after the 
occurrence. (R. 237, ex. D-18, D-35, D-36). Despite plaintiff's 
noncompliance with the five-day notice provision, U.S. Construction 
paid for the interference. (R. 237, ex. D-25). 
Moreover, representatives of u. S. construction and Jacobs 
Engineering, at a meeting held on August 22, 1979 for the purpose ci' 
reviewing plaintiff's claims, encouraged plaintiff to prepare 
documentation of the claims, some of which dated back to the 
beginning of the project, for consideration on the merits. (R. 237,' 
ex. D-18). Four days prior to this meeting, plaintiff's president 
had met with U. S. Construction's president for the purpose of 
reviewing and revising the claim that plaintiff was planning to 
present on August 22. (R. 238 at 71-80). 
There is no suggestion in the Record that at either of 
these meetings ~nv represent~tive of u. s. Construction or Jacobs 
Engineering told plaintiff that its claims would not he considered 
because of noncompliance '"ith the five-nay notice provision. On t'' 
contrary, plaintiff was told to suhmit the claim ann su?porting 
documentation for con~i1eration on the merits. Plaintiff did so a· 
the claims were ultimatalv denied on the merits, without even an 
allusion to the five-dav provisin~. IR. 23~, ax. D-271. 
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With this evidence in the Record that Respondents waived 
the five-day notice provision of the subcontract, plaintiff's 
failure to comply with that provision for the period prior to August 
8, 1977 is no basis for sustaining the summary judgment entered 
below. As noted above, plaintiff gave advance notice of its claias 
arising after August 8, 1977, and therefore complied with the 
five-day provision with respect to the claims that occurred after 
that date. 
IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS IMPROPER 
ON PLAINTIFF'S OTHER CLAIMS. 
Plaintiff has asserted three causes of action against 
Wyoming Mineral (the lessee of the real property) and two against 
Jacobs Engineering. These claims were not argued to the district 
court, and Respondents devoted only five pages of the brief to 
them. All depend upon the disputed issues of material fact 
previously discussed. 
A. Foreclosure of Mechanic's Lien. 
Plaintiff seeks to foreclose its properly perfected 
mechanic's lien upon Wyoming Mineral's leasehold interest in the 
land. Respondents contend that plaintiff's lien is limited by the 
subcontract price and, in support, cite Sierra Nevada Lumber Co. v. 
Whitmore, 24 Utah 131, 138, 66 P. 779 (1901). In Whitmore, the 
subcontractor's work was within the scope of its subcontract. In 
the present case, however, there are facts in the Record showing 
~~at plaintiff's subcontract was abandoned hy the substantial change 
:~ the nature and scope of plaintiff's work. It makes no sense to 
c0~tinue the mechanic's lien statute, which gives plaintiff a lien 
'·· '""' "•.13lup 0f th0 sor·.1icco rendererl, labor performed or materials 
-] 3-
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furni•hed,• Utah Code Ann. S 38-1-3 (1953), as limiting the lien to 
the price of an abandoned subcontract. 
Because of the facts in the Record that reveal abandonment 
of the 8Ubcontract and would, if proved at trial, allow plaintiff tc 
recover in quasi-contract, the present case is unripe for a 
determination of plaintiff's mechanic's lien rights at this time. 
8. Interference with Plaintiff's Work. 
Respondents assert, at cages 35-36 of. their brief, that 
Count V of plaintiff's complaint for Wyoming Mineral's and its agem 
Jacobs Engineering's interference with plaintiff's work should have 
been dismissed below because plainti~f had no contract with Wyoming 
Mineral or Jacobs Engineering. 
There are facts in the Record establishing that Jacobs 
Engineering, the on-site project engineer, interfered with 
plaintiff's work by scheduling simultaneous work by numerous craft: 
causing plaintiff unexpectedly high labor costs. (R. 240 at 
84-84). Because Wyoming Mineral assigned all of its rights and 
duties under its general contract with u. S. Construction to Jacobs 
Engineering, including the right to coordinate the work, Jacobs 
acted as Wyoming's agent, and Wyoming is therefore liable for 
Jacobs' interference to the same extent as Jacobs itself. ( R. 240, 
ex. P-61). 
It is now widely recognized that one who intentionally 
commits acts that interf.,re with another's pPrformance of a contra: 
becomes liable for the interference, unless the acts are privileg•· 
We may generalize that any intenrlerl anrl unorivlleqerl 
interference which causes loss to either oartv tn a transact!"" 
- 1 ~-
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1s actionable by the party suffering the loss. • • • Thus, a~ 
conduct which is intended to and which, in fact, makes 
performance more onerous is, unless privileged, a tort against 
the promisor. 
Harper, "Interference with Contractual Relations,• 47 Nw. L.Rev. 
873, 883 (1953). Accord, W. Prosser, Law of Torts S 129 (4th ed. 
1971). The quoted language from Professor Harper's article was 
expressly approved in Goodall v. Columbia Ventures, Inc., 374 
F.Supp. 1324, 1332 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
This Court has approved this cause of action: 
In order to establish a right to recover on such a cause of 
action the plaintiffs would have to show that the defendants, 
without justification, by some wrongful and malicious act, 
interfered with the plaintiff's right of contract, and that 
actual damage resulted. 
3oter v. Wasatch Development Corp., 21 Utah 2d 224, 443 P.2d 663 
(1968). Other cases make it clear that the "wrongful and malicious• 
act mentioned in Soter need not be done with actual malice or ill 
will: 
"Malice" is an element of the tort only to the extent that •the 
intentional doing of a wrongful act without legal or social 
justification" is malicious; "malice" in this context does not 
require "actual malice or ill will." 
Aljassim v. SS South Star, 323 F.Supp. 918, 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), 
quoting from Campbell v. Gates, 236 N.Y. 457, 460, 141 N.E. 914, 915 
( 19 2 3) . 
Professor Prosser agrees that, in this context, malice 
simply means the intentional doing of an act known to interfere with 
a~other's contract: 
The early cases, with their emphasis upon "malice," regarded 
proof of an improper motive as an essential part of the 
pla1ntiff's cause of action. As the tort became more firmly 
""cta!lli<ohPrl, there was a gradual shift of emphasis, until today 
-1 5-
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it is generally agreed that an intentional interference with t~ 
existing contractual relations of another is prima facie 
sufficient for liability, and that the burden of proving that ~ 
is •justified• rests upon the defendant. 
W. Prosser, Law of Torts ~ 129 at 942 (4th ed. 1971). Jacobs 
Engineering's intentional choice to cause interference with 
plaintiff's work by schedulinq a large volume of simultaneous work 
in order to bring the project back on schedule is sufficient 
••alice• for purposes of this tort. 
Plaintiff may recover for the interference caused by Jacobs 
Engineering on another theory as well. Jacobs Engineering, just as 
other professionals such as doctors, accountants and lawyers, oweda 
duty to perform its engineering function with reasonable care. 
United States for the Use of Los Angeles Testing Laboratory v. 
Rogers & Rogers, 161 F.Supp. 132 (S.D. Cal. 1958). 
It is clear that privity of contract is not a bar to 
recovery for breach of this duty, but extends to all persons who m~ 
forseeably be injured by the engineer's breach. Millner v. Elmer 
Fox & Co., 529 P.2d 806 (Utah 1974) (accountant): Rogers & Rogers, 
supra (architect). In Rogers & Rogers, supra, an architect was in 
charge of supervising a construction project. The prime contractor, 
who was not in privity with the architect, suffered damages as a 
result of the architect's failure to perform its supervisory duties 
with due care. The architect's motion for summarv judgment on the 
ground, inter alia, that it was not in privity with the injured 
contractor was denied. 
The Record thus oresents genuine issues of material fact 
with respect to plaintiff's claims aoainst Jacohs Engineering anrl 
-lf,-
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Wyoming Mineral: Jacobs Engineering, supervising the project ae 
assignee of Wyoming Mineral's contract with u. s. Construction, 
caused well-documented interference to plaintiff. (R. 237, ex. 
o-34). Indeed, there are facts in the Record to show that Jacobe 
Engineering intentionally chose to cause plaintiff extra 
interference and expense in order to make up lost time in the 
schedule. (R. 240 at 84-85). These factual issues of whether there 
was interference, an~, if so its cause and effect, preclude s~ary 
judgment on plaintiff's claims against Jacobs Engineering and 
Wyoming Mineral. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has shown that important genuine issues of 
material fact are present in each of plaintiff's claims. This Court 
shonld remand all of plaintiff's claims to the district court for 
trial. 
Respectfully submitte~, 
Warren Patten 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
800 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the~ day of November, 1979, I 
delivered two true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's 
Reply Brief to Gordon L. Roberts, Daniel M. Allred and Val R. 
Antczak of Parsons, Behle and Latimer, 79 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, Attorneys for Respondents. 
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